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Central and Local Government and the Provision of Municipal Medicine, 1919-1939 
 
In this article we explore the extent to which local authorities in England and Wales, 
during a period described as the ‘zenith of responsible local government’1, were able 
to assert and carry through their own agendas.  In doing this we examine, by way of 
the expanding role and provenance of municipal health services, the tension between 
responsibilities and autonomy.  Of necessity, we thus also engage with the nature of 
the ‘centre’ and in so doing are informed by, and contribute to, broader discussions of 
the nature of central-local relations.  We highlight the importance of disaggregating 
‘central government’, as well as the nature of individual ministries at different stages 
in their history – in this case the Ministry of Health (MoH) and its regional off-shoot, 
the Welsh Board of Health.  We further show that ‘autonomy’ or ‘influence’ must be 
seen as complex, shifting, and often contradictory, with local authorities 
simultaneously both resisting and exploiting Whitehall influence as the occasion 
demanded as well as being themselves internally divided over policy formation and 
implementation. 
 
The article so contributes to both the history of local government and to the pre-
history of the National Health Service (NHS).  As we have variously argued, 
historical writing on health care provision has tended to highlight the NHS and the 
medical services of the Poor Law, but to neglect the municipal services of the inter-
war period, their scale and scope notwithstanding.
2
  At a time, such as the present, 
when the so-called ‘command and control’ model of the health service governance is 
subject to widespread criticism, a fuller understanding of what public sector services 
preceded the NHS has contemporary as well as historical significance.  This piece is 
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part of a wider project, funded by the Wellcome Trust, which analyses in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms the great geographical and temporal variations in 
the municipal health sector in the 1920s and 1930s.  The aim is to provide a more 
nuanced understanding of municipal medicine than is currently available, using both 
statistical data and local and national archival material.
3
  The project has involved two 
distinct, but inter-related, stages.  Quantitative analysis has identified four English and 
Welsh County Boroughs – Barnsley, West Hartlepool, Eastbourne and Newport 
(Monmouthshire) – as representing a spectrum of rich-poor, low Labour 
representation-high Labour representation areas.  The intention here has been to select 
case studies which could be taken as representative of a whole range of county 
borough types.
4
   
 
In this article we focus on the relationship between the County Boroughs and the 
Ministry of Health.  The former were the top tier of the local authority hierarchy and 
had significant heath service powers and duties.  It is notable that local government 
experts of the 1940s such as William Robson and J.H. Warren singled County 
Boroughs out for praise.  The former found them the ‘most enterprising type of 
council’5 while the latter similarly described them as ‘the most highly developed type 
of English Local Government administration’.6  In the wake of the First World War, 
and particularly with the passing of the 1929 Local Government Act, County Borough 
health powers and duties significantly expanded.
7
  The 1929 Act allowed, for 
instance, for municipal authorities to ‘appropriate’ Poor Law institutions and in places 
like London was used in an attempt to build up a comprehensive hospital and health 
care system free of any Poor Law association.
8
  As we shall see, it also had other 
implications for the governance of municipal health services. 
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Choosing case studies based on statistical analysis, rather than the more usual method 
of locating a rich body of local archival material, has its pitfalls as well as its 
advantages.  Two of the areas – Eastbourne and Barnsley – have not yielded the same 
quantity of correspondence with the centre, nor the same depth of issues, as West 
Hartlepool and Newport.  This may, naturally, be the result of relevant files having 
been destroyed, or simply lost.  Equally, however, the very distinct possibility that 
such correspondence never existed in the first, suggests that our methodology has 
revealed something that a less systematic approach might have ignored: namely that 
the lack of tension between the centre and certain localities was as an important 
feature of central-local relations as conflict. 
 
Discussing the nature of the relationship between local bodies and central 
government, Lowe and Rollings suggest that historians, unlike political scientists, 
have tended to accept the ‘Westminster narrative’.  This, they claim, has an implicit 
assumption about ‘the unproblematic nature of the policy process’, with a ‘neutral’ 
bureaucracy implementing, the wishes of a unitary state characterised by 
parliamentary sovereignty and strong Cabinet government.  In fact, they argue, the 
first decades of the twentieth century saw the ‘the brittleness of the accommodation 
between government and governance…fully exposed…through the evolving 
relationship between central and local government’.9  Local authorities had 
traditionally enjoyed ‘considerable scope for initiative, but this was rapidly eroded’ 
for although local authorities had increased duties this was not matched with an 
increase in independent income.  Between 1920 and 1938 the percentage of local 
authority income from central government grants rose from 30 per cent to 44 per 
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cent.
10
  Increased revenue from central government meant, in principle at least, 
greater central control over how that money was spent – hence the tension we 
identified earlier, between greater responsibility and potentially declining autonomy. 
 
The block grants system, created by the 1929 Act, exemplified this trend, and further 
reinforced the lack of flexibility inherent in the rating system of revenue generation.
11
  
Ashford places such developments in a longer term context of, in welfare terms at 
least, the centre subordinating localities, a process dating back at least to the Whig 
reforms of the first half of the nineteenth century.
12
  A further twist in this complex 
historical narrative is highlighted by Davis, who points out that in the wake of the 
post-1918 ‘flurry of social measures’ central government in fact became more 
cautious ‘about imposing further duties upon local authorities in the 1930s’, and that 
the trend, even before 1939, was heading towards national solutions for what were 
increasingly perceived as national problems.
13
  Some accounts of the origins and 
development of the NHS stress this very point.  
 
And while the inter-war era may have been the period where local authorities enjoyed 
the greatest powers, this does not mean that their position was seen by all 
contemporaries as unassailable, or indeed justifiable.  Influential critics, such as the 
Fabian Society and the think-tank Political and Economic Planning, argued that local 
authority boundaries no longer reflected current conditions; that local government 
finance was built on shaky foundations; and that service provision varied widely from 
area to area.  This in turn led to proposals encapsulated in the health field by Fox’s 
notion of hierarchical regionalism.
14
  As Dupree has recently suggested, health 
services were the ‘prime example of the inefficiency of the existing system’, and it 
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was these, and particularly the hospital services, ‘which were seen to gain most from 
reorganisation along regional lines’.15  Local government thus appeared to be 
threatened from a number of different, and superficially conflicting, directions. Yet, 
as we show, the reluctance of the Ministry of Health to assert itself, even with 
recalcitrant authorities, indicates a picture much more complex than might at first 
appear.
16
  For Wales, the picture is further complicated by the Welsh Board of Health 
which simultaneously acted as an intermediary between the localities and Whitehall 
while of itself seeking, often successfully, to exert a degree of autonomy.  Tensions 
between the centre and the localities were, moreover, attributable not only to financial 
constraints. 
 
Before moving to the main body of the paper, however, it is important to ascertain 
more specifically what the Ministry was trying to police or implement.  The period 
around the end of the First World War saw the introduction of measures aimed at 
improving specific aspects of the nation’s health – notably the 1917 Venereal 
Diseases Act, the 1918 Maternity and Child Welfare Act, the 1921 Tuberculosis 
Act.
17
  There were further additions to local authority services throughout the period, 
but in general terms the 1920s was the decade of the rapid expansion of clinics and 
dispensaries while the 1930s saw both expansion and consolidation.  The 1929 Local 
Government Act was significant here, for in essence what it sought to do was improve 
the administration and delivery of services by taking health out of the remit of the 
Poor Law and coordinating it with both other council services and voluntary 
provision.  The Act also replaced the system of percentage grants to the local 
authorities, which had matched local government expenditure on specified services, 
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with the block grant system.  The latter was not tied to particular spending patterns, 
and was based, inter alia, on the degree of local need. 
 
We now turn to an examination of the Ministry of Health.  We explore how the 
optimism of its early days dissipated through the loss of key individuals and the 
impact of economic retrenchment, and how this reinforced the famously conservative 
tendencies of its antecedent body, the Local Government Board (LGB).  Next we 
assess how this affected its self-image, its role in relation to the localities, and its 
national vision for health provision.
18
  In so doing we consider the tactics and 
mechanisms used by the Ministry to forward its aims, as well as its policy objectives. 
We then move on to argue that, since local authorities were not in fact passive 
recipients of Ministry advice and government policy, it is important to consider 
agency at the local level.
19
  Just as the impact of individuals at the national level was 
vital in shaping the Ministry, so too at local level were certain people instrumental in 
determining how those policies were received.  In particular we examine the role of 
the local Medical Officer of Health (MOH), members of the Public Assistance 
Committee (PAC) and Public Health Committee (PHC), and the Town Clerk.  In 
different ways, each had an important role to play in relations with the Ministry.  In 
the final section we discuss, through two case studies, situations where Ministry 
influence was particularly successful. 
 
The establishment of the Ministry of Health in 1919 was heralded by George 
Newman, Chief Medical Officer (CMO), as a major health advance.  It was, he 
claimed, indicative of Parliament’s decision that ‘the national health is of supreme 
and vital importance’ to both the individual and the nation as a whole.20  The 
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Ministry’s creation must, however, be placed in a wider context.  Rhetorically at least, 
post-war reconstruction was to embrace not only health but also housing, education, 
and employment.  Nor was this simply altruistic.  The Coalition government was 
concerned to forestall industrial and political unrest and saw social reform as one way 
of doing so.  Nonetheless, the formation of the Ministry of Health was more than a 
sop to revolutionaries and its genesis suggests that it was taken seriously by the Lloyd 
George government.  Addison, the first Minister of Health, although a ‘dull’ figure, 
nevertheless ‘commanded much respect for his energy and enthusiasm, for his long 
connection with welfare policies…and for his close political association with the 
Prime Minister’.  He was a key figure in the post-war drive for the creation of a 
‘developmental state’, as was Sir Robert Morant, the Ministry’s first Permanent 
Secretary.  Both Morant and Newman were seen as highly competent and dynamic 
administrators and among that ‘most creative civil servants of the age’. 21   However 
the very way in which the Ministry was set up was later to cause problems in that the 
apparent equality of status enjoyed by the Permanent Secretary and the CMO became 
a considerable source of tension after Morant’s death, something which did little for 
the department’s effective functioning. 
 
Initially, though, the Ministry got off to a vigorous start, backing up its strong vision 
to improve the nation’s health with a commitment to spend, for example on the 
development and expansion of clinics and dispensaries.  In material in the public 
domain, the Ministry continued throughout the inter-war period to assert a positive 
message, even during the years of retrenchment.  For example, following the cuts of 
1921, the Ministry optimistically described this as an opportunity to survey the whole 
field of health services, so that when the economic circumstances permitted fresh 
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progress to be made, policies would be based upon ‘a mature and deliberate plan’. 22  
To an extent, the Ministry had cause for its optimism over the inter-war period in that 
in some ways its approach appeared to be vindicated.  Not only were central 
government and local authorities spending more on health and developing services, 
there was also as steady improvement in the nation’s health.23  Citing the 
improvement in housing, the better ‘personal habits’ of individuals and the expansion 
of personal services supporting the health of population which ‘between them 
embrace the seven ages of man, from cradle to grave’, the 1937 Annual Report noted 
that most of the ‘the chief killing diseases take year by year a smaller toll of the 
population, especially of the young’.  Consequently both adults and, especially, 
children now enjoyed ‘a healthier and fuller life than at any time since the Industrial 
Revolution’24  
 
But behind the almost relentless optimism propagated by the CMOs through the 
Annual Reports, the reality was much more problematic. As Welshman notes, 
contemporary voices raised doubts about the Ministry’s efficacy.  Sir Arthur 
Newsholme, the ex-chief MO of the LGB, observed in 1925 that the Ministry was 
‘seriously hampered by the inchoate condition of the local medical work under 
Insurance Committees and Poor Law Guardians’.  And the local government expert 
Robson wrote disparagingly of the Ministry’s ‘insipid aspirations’, remarking that on 
many questions it was ‘discreetly and demurely silent’.25  None of this was helped by 
the spending cuts of the early 1920s – the Geddes Axe – which not only impacted on 
services but also caused the numbers of civil servants employed in the Ministry to be 
cut by a third from 6,500 to just over 4,000.
26
  This meant that not only was the scope 
to expand services drastically curtailed, but also that the Ministry’s ability to enforce 
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existing policies was reduced.  As one senior official put it, work had to be ‘delegated 
to an increasing degree, more and more responsibility being thrown onto the junior 
staff’.  He acknowledged that this was probably a common experience in all 
government departments but that, nonetheless, the impact had been most profound at 
the Ministry of Health.
27
  In such circumstances, it is understandable that local 
authorities, if determined to pursue their own agenda, could hold out against the 
centre. 
 
The result of the Baldwin–Fisher administrative reforms, and the position and 
influence of the chief finance officers in government departments in relation to 
retrenchment, have been widely debated.  Lowe argues that they gave the Treasury 
the ‘means to impose from within the control which it previously striven to impose 
from without’.  Peden, on the other hand, uses evidence from the Ministries of 
Labour, Transport, and Health, and the Board of Trade to suggest that chief finance 
officers were ‘not obstructive, although naturally they urged financial prudence, and 
warned colleagues when proposals were unlikely to receive Treasury sanction’.28 
Savage adds an important further dimension by suggesting officials at the Ministry of 
Health did not in fact need any such policing, as they saw the state rather than the 
poor as their constituency.  Consequently they were inclined to see fiscal prudence 
rather than extravagant social reforms as their primary role.
29
  
 
Indeed, the very structure and inheritance of the Ministry tended to work against 
innovation and expansion.  Although named the ‘Ministry of Health’, one of its major 
legacies from the LGB was the responsibility of anything related to local government 
and its interaction with the central state.  This not only meant that the Ministry 
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inherited a large part of the Board’s heavy case load but also, as Stacey observes, that 
‘the system of local government acted as a filter on the vision of the Ministry’s 
staff.’30  For some observers, even at the point of creation the Ministry was an 
unhappy marriage of the old and the new and prompted largely by the impact of the 
Haldane Report.
 31
  The latter had promoted the idea of a new administrative 
functionalist school of civil servants who were to be characterised by ‘long term 
thinking’.  In some departments this had created ‘exclusive cadres of officials (who) 
sought to rise above the day-to-day business of departmental work and plan for the 
future’.  Morant himself ‘had no patience with the view that inefficient local 
authorities ought to be left to wallow in their inefficiency in order to preserve some 
sacred principle of autonomy.’32  For the newly created MoH he wanted to ‘bring in 
new blood, give a “lift” to the whole corps, develop dynamic energy throughout it, 
and infect the secretariat too, and generally give enhanced prestige to the whole 
Ministry.’33 
 
But as Stacey argues, Morant’s unexpected death in 1920, coupled with Addison’s 
political demise and the more general context of renewed administrative and fiscal 
conservatism, dealt a fatal blow to plans for a dynamic and forward looking Ministry 
of Health; rather, the ethos and inheritance of the LGB were to dominate.  This was 
reinforced by Arthur Robinson, Morant’s successor, who was a generalist of the old 
school and who remained in post until 1935.  Furthermore, many of the talented 
individuals brought in by Morant either left the Ministry or were passed over for 
promotion.  In short, as Webster asserts, from its early promise the MoH became, by 
the mid-1920s, a ‘career backwater staffed by second-rate minds suitable to act only 
as instruments of regulation’.34  The dominance of the LGB’s way of working within 
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the Ministry was thus, by the mid 1920s, crucial in informing its relations with local 
government.  Rather than the top-down, centrist approach promoted by Morant and 
his allies, the Board’s approach had its roots in the practices of nineteenth century 
administration.  The early twentieth century system of English government was noted 
by contemporaries for the absence of any legal hierarchy in the different levels of 
government, despite the constraints of statute and central government supervision of 
the localities.
35
  As Davis observes, it is important to remember, ‘the extent to which 
Victorian government depended on negotiation rather than decree to implement its 
wishes in the localities’.36 
 
The main tools at the Ministry’s disposal were the powers of veto over Local Acts and 
over local schemes requiring loans for capital expenditure; the publishing of model 
bylaws; and, after 1930, the ability to with-hold a percentage of an authority’s block 
grant.  However the Ministry tended to stress its position as adviser and arbiter, 
promoting a view of itself as a font of national expertise and thereby adopting an 
advisory and supervisory role in relation to local authorities.  As Newman himself had 
noted, relationships with local authorities were ‘built on the basis of assent and 
consent rather than on compulsion’.37  This point was reinforced by Ministry official 
Sir Gwilym Gibbon in a way says much about the departmental mindset.  Gibbon 
noted that the Ministry had ‘no general powers to step in on a Local Authority and 
require it to do this, that, and the other at its will’.  To do so would be ‘rash’ and 
would result in the central body being told ‘to mind its own business – fortunately, for 
the last thing we can afford to weaken in this country is the spirit of local 
government’.38  
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The vision of the Ministry as a centre for knowledge and expertise was to some 
degree accepted at local level.  The Town Clerk for Birmingham, for instance, wrote 
favourably of the expertise and national vision the Ministry was able to provide.
39
  
One way in which the latter tried to advance information sharing among local 
authorities was through the annual league tables of costing returns pioneered by 
Gibbon.
40
  These covered Poor Law institutions, maternity homes, tuberculosis 
hospitals and other municipal services, and showed how much it cost to maintain the 
institution expressed in per patient per week terms.
41
  The Ministry promoted these 
tables as an important means of allowing local authorities to gauge the financial value 
of the services provided to their citizens through comparison with other localities.  
While in general the Ministry believed they demonstrated that ‘good value for money 
was received’, the tables also ‘brought into clearer light the advantages which could 
be secured by such measures as regular local scrutiny of costs, centralized contracting 
for supplies, and amalgamation of medical and nursing staffs sometimes separately 
employed in cognate services’.42  In fact the tables reveal the wide disparities in the 
cost of services.  So, for instance, in 1935 the national average cost per patient per 
week in a municipal maternity home was £4.18s.2d.  In West Hartlepool’s the cost 
was £4.5.4 ½ d while in Eastbourne it was £7.9.10d.
43
 
 
It is clear that these tables did have some impact, at least in council debates.  In 
Eastbourne, for example, the costs of the municipal maternity home in relation to 
other homes listed in the costing returns were avidly compared and justified: ‘The 
cost of the external midwife is included in our return, and not in most of the others.  
Fees are paid in practically every case, reducing this cost by about 42%.’44  However, 
the fact that there continued to be wide variations in costs throughout the period 
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suggests that the tables had less impact than Gibbon either anticipated or 
acknowledged.  It would appear that in this context, the MoH saw its role simply as a 
facilitator of information sharing, rather than as actively pushing greater equality 
between the localities.  As Gibbon’s junior, Ross, observed, ‘I was not myself 
convinced at the time that the results were worthy of the labour involved…Good 
results can be obtained only if there is close supervision from the centre’.45   
 
The Ministry also tried to use its influence to push greater co-operation between 
individual councils and voluntary hospitals, not least by way of commentary in its 
Annual Reports.  Although Stewart identifies the strong hostility of Labour in London 
towards voluntary hospitals,
46
 the picture elsewhere reveals a much more complex 
mixture of attitudes which could embrace both ideology and pragmatism.  In 
Barnsley, for example, the Labour council remained keen to work with the local 
voluntary hospital, perhaps unsurprisingly given that it was primarily funded by local 
miners throughout the inter-war period and was seen as forming part of the long 
tradition of miners’ self-help schemes.47  The complexity of the local authorities’ 
attitudes towards voluntary organisations was compounded by the wariness voluntary 
hospitals felt towards the state sector, with many fearing that their individual 
characters would become subsumed by an impersonal municipal bureaucracy.  In this 
context, it was the Ministry’s task to bring these sides together and it stressed the 
importance of ‘the mental attitude to be adopted by the local authorities and the 
voluntary hospitals towards this question of consultation’.  The MoH thus noted with 
disapproval that in some areas ‘consultation was regarded as a somewhat unpleasant 
statutory duty which could be performed once and for all by a formal meeting without 
any practical measures for consideration’.48  Similarly, the Ministry saw part of its 
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duties as encouraging local authority cooperation with other voluntary agencies 
operating in the health field.  As one Annual Report pointed out, local authorities did 
not as yet realise ‘how many and varied are the services which they might well accept 
from voluntary agencies in the matter of organisation, in detail of administration and 
in general support’.  There should be ‘mutual aid and cooperation’ between statutory 
and voluntary bodies.  Any criticism ‘should be accompanied by practicable 
suggestions for remedying the defects and should be offered with sympathetic 
appreciation of the difficulties involved’.  It was only by such an approach that 
‘supervision’ could be effective and a ‘friendly cooperation’ established.49  There is a 
strong sense here of both the desirability of a mixed economy of welfare and, within 
that, of the leading role to be played by public bodies.  
 
Although Ministry officials, and particularly those with an LGB background, tended 
to emphasise the positive aspects of their advisory relationship with local government, 
the fact remained that the Ministry had very little real power.  The majority of health 
legislation during this period was permissive rather than compulsory.  As a result 
much actual policy decision making, as well as implementation, was left to local 
discretion.  In many circumstances, the Ministry’s only options were persuasion and 
guidance.  Consequently there was a palpable sense of frustration among at least some 
civil servants at the degree to which petty squabbles and local particularism could 
inhibit health development.  Officials complained, for instance, of the ‘antagonism 
arising either as a result of vested interests or mistaken sense of so called civic pride’ 
which often came in the way of central attempts to encourage the pooling of resources 
and the creation of joint schemes.
50
  Even Gibbon, that public exponent of local 
authority independence, in private was much more ambivalent.  ‘Theoretically’ he 
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supported local authority ‘liberty and independence’, but in practice ‘when he dealt 
with particular cases he was something of a bureaucrat’ on those rare occasions, such 
as the sanctioning of loans, where he had full authority.
51
 
 
Equally, it is apparent that some localities, at least, felt that the Ministry was far too 
willing, despite its protestations to the contrary, to interfere in the minutiae of daily 
service provision.  Reports, and ensuing correspondence, by MoH inspectors could 
become caught up in almost absurd levels of detail.  The Ministry engaged in lengthy 
correspondence with Newport over whether or not it was appropriate for the MOH to 
also act as police surgeon, and with West Hartlepool on the question of the 
positioning of the door of its Venereal Diseases clinic.
52
  Clearly, both sides had cause 
to feel frustrated and to be involved in an apparently endless round of arguments, 
negotiations, and all too often inaction.  There was also no guarantee that attempted 
interference from the centre would even be consistent.  In Newport, a proposal to turn 
over part of the workhouse to accommodation for families of ex-servicemen received 
conflicting responses from the officials in Whitehall and at the Welsh Board of Health 
in Cardiff.  While the resolution of Newport Housing Committee was approved in 
Wales, this decision was over-ridden by the Ministry.  The latter sent a telegram to the 
Town Clerk stating baldly that ‘Ministry informed by General Inspector that scheme 
for conversion of workhouse is impracticable.’  The leader column of the local 
newspaper was quick to point out the inconsistencies: ‘Is the Ministry of Health a 
house divided against itself?  Does one department veto what another department 
approves?’.53  We shall encounter further instances of differences between London 
and Cardiff below.  It was the high degree of attempted interference into the running 
of services that led one Town Clerk to assert there was ‘a danger of the central 
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machinery being clogged’.  Local authorities should be entrusted with ‘with greater 
executive powers without central control in matters of local government’.  Such a 
course would be to the benefit of both central and local government.
54
  The 
contradiction between Gibbon’s vision, at least as publicly stated, and the reality 
perfectly exemplifies the ambiguous position of the centre in relation to the localities 
during the period.  The MoH, while apparently pro-local independence, was trying to 
push a national agenda.  Paradoxically, though, through its lack of coercive powers it 
was forced to focus on the petty details of local administration.  We next consider 
how this tension played out in its working relationships with local authorities. 
 
It was one thing for the Ministry to use Annual Reports and circulars to point the 
general directions in which they expected local authorities to act, but quite another to 
actually initiate action in an unwilling authority and here the survey reports of the 
1930s are extremely rich source.
55
  They reveal the varying tactics employed by the 
Ministry in its attempts to improve local health care provision without upsetting local 
sensibilities.  The surveys show that the central authority, while often internally 
critical of local services, did try to take a ‘hands off’ approach wherever possible.  
Newport’s survey revealed that the borough was making progress in service 
provision.  Although civil servants felt that there might be a need to make further 
enquiries, Dr Bruce Low, an Inspector with the Welsh Board, argued that these should 
be ‘cut down to the minimum and Newport left to work out their own salvation’.  The 
council’s own documents, he continued, showed that it was ‘taking their health 
services seriously’.  Matters would further improve, Low suggested, ‘as a result of the 
survey and the appointment of a new MOH’.  Dr Low felt vindicated in his approach 
when a further communication from Newport appeared to indicate that the council 
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had ‘dealt faithfully with the points raised in the survey letter’.  He thus concluded 
that ‘Newport town council wish to improve their health services without any pressure 
from the department’. 56  In this instance the Ministry’s approach of reasoned 
guidance and low key monitoring was apparently effective.  Yet, closer examination 
shows that this worked with councils who were broadly amenable to suggestions for 
improvement, and or for improvements which were uncontroversial, it failed 
completely to deal with intransigent authorities or in any advocacy of unpopular 
schemes. 
 
Again to begin with an example from Newport, we find that the council’s willingness 
to act on suggestions such as increasing the number of visits by health visitors to 
children under five notwithstanding, when it came to the larger issues of appropriation 
and greater cooperation with the voluntary hospital - the Royal Gwent – and with 
Monmouthshire County Council, a different story emerges.  It was from this point on 
that the Welsh Board ran into difficulties with this particular County Borough.  What 
followed was a low level bureaucratic battle which demonstrated both the ultimate 
weakness of the Board’s position and the key role of a few determined individuals in 
shaping council policy.  In April 1934 the Welsh Board convened a meeting with 
council representatives.  The Board sought to press the points noted above and, 
further, to urge closer cooperation with the Welsh National Memorial Association, a 
voluntary body set up in the Edwardian era to campaign on Welsh health issues and 
which was, from the early 1920s, responsible for the Principality’s tuberculosis 
services; and between the Health Committee and the School Medical Officer.  
However it soon became apparent that council representatives’ ‘interest in these other 
matters appeared to be rather overshadowed by their interest in ...appropriation’.  At 
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the meeting the Town Clerk insisted on knowing the advantages of appropriation, 
‘apart from the sentimental ones of dissociating the treatment of sick from the stigma 
of the Poor Law’.  There then followed a ‘long discussion in which very considerable 
objection was raised’ to appropriation, mainly due to the ‘influence of some of the 
stronger members of the PAC’. 57 
 
Following this meeting the council decided to reject appropriation on the grounds that 
it ‘would not give any additional benefits…and would only result in additional 
expenditure in administration and be, in fact, a change in name only’.58  And, despite 
promptings from the Board, the council continued to refuse to consider appropriation, 
‘as they were hoping to obtain definite examples where appropriation had been 
effected without additional expenditure’.  This had been promised by the Board at the 
meeting in April and asked for in two subsequent letters.
59
  The Board was obviously 
needled by this recurring challenge to their position, and sent back a rather testy letter 
stating that ‘the Department do not understand why the enquiry is repeated’.  This 
further observed that five years after the passing of the 1929 Act the council should 
‘be in a position to indicate the general policy of institutional provision they have in 
mind’.60  It should also be noted that the claim, often made by local authorities, that 
appropriation would bring increased expenditure was to a large extent erroneous as 
the process for the most part involved shifting resources from one account to 
another.
61
 
 
Yet the council continued to stonewall and the question of appropriation was dropped 
by the Board, which seemed to accept that it was fighting a losing battle and therefore 
needed to shift its ground.  Consequently, it then pressed for improvements in the 
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relations between the voluntary hospital and the council, and between Newport and 
Monmouthshire over the development of a joint laboratory.  However, here too it was 
stymied, although in fact this was not solely the fault of the local authority.  The 
Royal Gwent appears to have been as unenthusiastic about the prospect of 
coordination as the council.  In July 1935 a Board of Health official observed that 
‘I’m afraid we can do nothing but wait another month or so’, and this month stretched 
to five as they waited for the council to reach a decision.  However, when an answer 
came it was simply that the MOH has been asked to ‘report generally upon the 
question of the establishment of a (joint) laboratory (with Monmouthshire County 
Council)’.62  By the beginning of 1937 the Welsh Board was resigned to the position: 
‘Perhaps in all circumstances it would be as well not to continue this rather protracted 
and indefinite correspondence, and to note this area as one for re-survey’.63  In fact 
Newport was not re-surveyed, and although some moves were made to improve the 
Poor Law hospital, it was never appropriated and cooperation with the Royal Gwent 
remained limited. 
 
If Newport had seemed dilatory to the Board, then its response to the survey was 
overwhelmingly enthusiastic compared to that of West Hartlepool, which refused to 
show interest even in the most minor recommendations.  The Borough Council 
conducted a generally successful war of attrition with the MoH throughout the 1930s, 
despite being subject to two surveys.  Although appropriation once again was a main 
bone of contention, there was also the wider issue of the council’s almost total lack of 
investment in its health services.  As with Newport, it is worth noting that despite the 
council’s unwillingness to act on Ministry suggestions the MoH did not retaliate with 
a threat to reduce the council’s block grant.  West Hartlepool’s basic position was 
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that, owing to the depression and thus ‘having regard to the urgent need for economy 
in local administration, which has arisen since the submission of the Inspector’s 
report, the present time (1932) is not opportune for putting into effect the Health 
Committee’s recommendations.’64  The internal response of the MoH was that ‘(we) 
can hardly accept this – but I am not sure how far the Department will wish to press 
the local authority’.65   Here was the Ministry’s fundamental problem.  While it did 
not believe it could ‘let the matter rest’, it was equally unclear as to how to move 
forward.  This was despite its belief that West Hartlepool’s ‘health services were 
starved in the days when the town was prosperous’.  In a passage which again 
highlights the significance of the composition of the council, this memorandum 
continued that ‘judging from one’s general knowledge of the Council, I imagine that 
the Council passed their resolution to defer consideration of any improvements 
without any regrets’.66 
 
Following communication wherein it became clear that ‘the Council still refuse to do 
anything of any amount’, the Ministry decided that ‘(there is no) use pursuing these 
matters further at present’, except to write once again indicating that they were 
‘dissatisfied’ and that they proposed to hold another survey ‘fairly soon’.67  The 
borough was re-surveyed in 1935, and despite the lack of progress made since the last 
survey, and the continually obstructive attitude of the council, the resurvey did not 
suggest any punitive measures.  The relevant passages are worth quoting at length as 
they illustrate precisely what the Ministry was up against, and the constraints upon it: 
(There) is an almost complete lack of coordination of medical services 
owing to the Council’s dilatory methods, and so far as West Hartlepool is 
concerned the Local Government Act, 1929, might never have been 
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passed…(The) dilatory and feeble response of the Borough Council in the 
past would seem at first sight, to call for a letter of severe censure with an 
emphatic demand for them to amend their ways.  But a letter of this sort 
would in all probability fail in its object… If the letter on the re-survey is 
very censorious, it might be discouraging to the members of the Health 
Committee and result in some of the less progressive councillors siding 
with the reactionaries.  It is important to encourage the PHC to adopt a 
coordinated hospital scheme… I would therefore recommend that the 
letter should begin with some acknowledgement of the few advances 
which the Council have made.
68
 
 
Here, as in Newport, the MoH appears to have been unable, and unwilling, to force 
the council to act when it did not wish to do so.  Despite the fact that the Ministry was 
able to withhold a proportion of a block grant if it did not feel that a local authority’s 
health services were efficient, this option is not even considered.  Indeed even the 
much weaker option of a letter of censure is rejected, in favour of a more positive 
communication.  This suggests that the Ministry felt that positive encouragement was 
the more effective tool, and that with-holding grant money was ultimately counter-
productive; or that it favoured a quiet relationship with local authorities, even 
reactionary ones, over implementing policy objectives, a position reinforced by its 
own culture and ethos; or even that by the mid-1930s bitter experience and the 
accumulated impact of living with retrenchment had brought home to officials just 
how difficult any progress could be in the face of an obstinate local body. 
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Both the foregoing examples point to the importance of the internal dynamics of local 
authorities when considering their relationship with the MoH.  The questions of 
appropriation and cooperation were obviously much more politically sensitive than 
the kind of small scale improvements asked for in the surveys.  The former not only 
raised issues which recalcitrant councils construed as involving large scale 
expenditure on their part but also, in seeking to improve health services on a broad 
front, challenged entrenched sectional and parochial interests.  It is worth examining 
this point in more detail, to show how individual or group interventions could have 
more immediate impact than anything suggested by the Ministry. 
 
The political make-up of a council naturally had an impact on policy, although it 
should not be assumed that there was a simple correlation between, for instance, the 
presence of a significant Labour Party representation and ‘progressive’ policies such 
as appropriation.  Rather, local and sectional politics clearly played a major role.  In 
West Hartlepool this was manifested in the dominance of the ‘business party’ and so, 
thereby, the local political scene being the preserve of believers in ‘financial 
orthodoxy’.  Hence it was not need, but what ‘economy and efficiency would allow’, 
that shaped local policy making.
69
  This approach was, moreover, strongly endorsed 
by the local Member of Parliament, Howard Griffen, a Conservative with a strong 
dislike of spending ratepayers’ money.  Writing to the Ministry on its survey’s 
recommendations, Griffen found it ‘really amazing that, when economy is so 
vehemently preached, your Ministry should send out instructions of this sort’.  This 
sort of behaviour was, he continued, ‘the old tale of officials making work for 
themselves.  Our town is very badly hit and in financial straits, and so cannot afford 
the luxury of humouring officialism’.70 
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The 1935 re-survey showed a greater awareness of the importance of internal council 
politics in the provision of health services.  This suggests that the MoH was becoming 
sensitive, or possibly resigned, to the fact that it was not simply enough to send a 
council a list of recommendation.  Rather, if it wanted change then it had to work 
through certain interest groups and individuals, or simply wait until internal changes 
shifted the dynamics of the council itself.  It was thus noted of West Hartlepool that 
there could be ‘little doubt that the Council has been dominated by a few small 
minded but influential members’ whose sole aim was to keep rates down at all costs, 
‘regardless of the efficiency of the health services’.  On the other hand, the ‘baleful 
influence of these members appears to be on the wane, and the Council appears to be 
rather less reactionary.  The members of the Health Committee, according to the 
Medical Officer of Health, have much greater influence than formerly’.71  
  
This comment reveals a further aspect of the complexity of the situation with which 
the Ministry had to deal – the relative position of committees, individuals on those 
committees, and officials.  Jones remarks on the importance of local authority 
committee chairmen.  Such individuals could run their committees as their own ‘petty 
empires’, a tendency emphasised by the fact that once elected to the post, they tended 
to hold it until retirement.
72
  Again, the West Hartlepool re-survey showed a greater 
sensitivity to this issue than previously.  The surveyor, Dr Donaldson, took the trouble 
to interview and actively solicit the support of ‘a very influential member of the 
Health Committee, Capt. Farmer, who is also Chair of the House Committee of the 
Hartlepools (voluntary) Hospital’.  He also had an interview with the Chairman of the 
Public Health Committee, a Mr Bloom, at which Donaldson stressed the importance 
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of cooperation with voluntary hospitals; the understaffing at Howbeck (the Poor Law 
Institution); and the need for its appropriation.  Bloom ‘promised to do all in his 
power to see that the recommendations of the Ministry should be complied with’.73   
 
Here, then, we have the issue of the importance of personality and of individuals in 
the policy process, a point which was acknowledged in the journal for public 
administrators at the time: 
There are some matters on which there is a conspiracy of silence.  
Everybody knows they are of supreme importance, but they are not 
mentioned except in conversations of unusual intimacy over bottles.  One 
of these is personality, and the part played by it…(We) know that there 
are councillors who govern the public life of their own town for a 
generation and town clerks who can speak with confidence for their 
councils because as a matter of fact what they advise is done.  And no 
doubt the same kind of thing happens in the civil service.
74
 
In both West Hartlepool and Newport, despite the prevailing anti-appropriation 
climate, individual councillors could and did speak up in its favour.  During one 
Newport council debate on the issue Councillor Mrs Hayward argued that no one, 
however poor, wanted to think that ‘your baby must be born in the workhouse’.  
While this was ‘no reflection on the hospital or the treatment… it was time it was 
called a Municipal Hospital’.  Councillor Ryan also spoke in favour of appropriation 
noting, correctly, that this could take place ‘without expense’75 
 
However, such councillors were often lone voices, or out of tune with the dominant 
influences on the Committee.
76
  As an internal MoH minute observed for West 
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Hartlepool, there were still further barriers to progress, as the sixty eight year old 
Master of Howbeck Institution was anti-appropriation: ‘So long as he continues at 
Howbeck I am afraid he will be a formidable obstacle and his opinion will carry much 
weight with the local councillors.’77  He was not alone – Institution Masters and ex-
Guardians, who often formed the bulk of the new PACs, were frequently anxious to 
guard what little remaining influence they possessed.  In Newport, for instance, Dr 
Low from the Welsh Board noted in 1934 that ‘it is obvious that the PAC are strongly 
entrenched and do not wish to hand over any of their authority to the Health 
Committee.  This is an undesirable situation and contrary to the spirit of the Local 
Government Act, 1929’.78   It is significant that Barnsley, which did appropriate its 
hospital, had ensured that when it formed its Public Assistance Committee it 
contained none of the old Guardians.
79
 
 
It was not, of course, simply the council’s elected members who influenced the 
direction of policy - local authority growth was ‘accompanied by the expansion and 
consolidation of an elite of municipal officials, many with the status and power of 
their political masters’.80  The position of Town Clerk offered much potential for the 
energetic and ambitious official.  As Jones observes, this official could ‘become the 
leader of the Council, directing and energising all its activities, or he can be its servant 
in the background, confined strictly to his legal duties’.81  The Newport Town Clerk 
clearly leaned towards the former position.  He actively spoke up at meetings for his 
own anti-appropriation agenda, and it was he who continued the correspondence with 
the Welsh Board, in a direct and personalised manner.  His method was to reply to 
any enquiry of the Board about appropriation with a letter insisting they furnish him 
with examples of where appropriation had occurred without additional cost.  Only 
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then would the council reconsider the position of their Poor Law institution.
82
  His 
key role was acknowledged by the civil servants in Cardiff: ‘it seems clear that the TC 
hopes that nothing will be done.  The clerk himself does not appear to be helpful.’83 
 
We should also acknowledge another key player, the Medical Officer of Health.  
MOsH were often keen to cooperate with the Ministry not only so as to improve 
public health, but in order to enhance their own status and to extend the remit of the 
health department as widely as possible.  Newport’s Dr Catto, for example, invested 
considerable energy in promoting appropriation and the coordination of the health 
services generally.  He wrote a lengthy and considered report on total hospital 
provision in the borough, concluding unreservedly that appropriation was the way 
forward.
84
  He kept separately, and ‘unofficially of course’, in touch with the Board of 
Health, updating them on the possibilities for progress.
85
  He also used his Annual 
Report to publicly outline his position.  In 1936, for instance, he declared that the 
coordination of medical services was improving as all were now under his 
supervision.  Furthermore, such coordination would be finally completed when ‘the 
appropriation of the Public Assistance Hospital is approved’.86  As a Roman Catholic, 
he was also key to ensuring that the campaign to extend birth control, popular among 
sections of the Labour party at the time, made no headway in Newport.
87
 
 
Dr McKeggie, the MOH for West Hartlepool, was similarly energetic and did 
everything he could to push for reforms.  At the time of the first survey he had only 
been in the job ten months when perhaps little could be expected of him.  But at the 
time of the re-survey he did all he could to cooperate with the Ministry, for example 
through supplying a confidential list of the improvements he felt were necessary and 
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the background to the internal politics of his Health Department and the council.  He 
was described by the surveyors as an energetic officer with, nonetheless and as might 
be predicted from what we have already seen of this particular local authority, an 
‘uphill fight to get improvements’.  It was thus unsurprising that in the period between 
the first and second surveys ‘he had not made much headway’.  Furthermore, and in a 
comment which also shows the frustration of Ministry officials with some local 
councillors, it was also noted that although McKeggie’s ‘energy has abated to some 
extent, he has kept to his programme of reforms, and seems to have had sufficient 
determination to wear down the (‘stupid and’ crossed out) obstinate resistance of a 
powerful section of the Council, and has succeeded in getting some of the reforms 
which he set out to obtain when he was first appointed’.  These reforms included an 
increase in number of sanitary inspectors and office staff, better premises for the 
school clinic, some improvements in the venereal diseases clinic, and better office 
accommodation.  And while he had ‘not succeeded, as yet, in persuading the Council 
to adopt a reasonable hospital policy, he seems to be getting them in a better frame of 
mind’.88  
 
Our analysis of the Ministry’s effectiveness in pushing for major reforms in health 
service administration in two of our case study areas raises the broader question of 
what it actually achieved.  As one internal document noted, it had generally been the 
case that ‘local authorities are slow to act upon the recommendations made to them, 
due very possibly to the lack of financial resources, but the general result of the 
surveys has been increased activity in Public Health matters’.89  However it was often 
the case that the ‘activity’ referred to here took the relatively low-level form of 
changing the times of venereal disease clinics, increasing the number of Maternity 
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and Child Welfare clinic sessions, or perhaps increasing the number of X-rays taken 
to detect tuberculosis.  While not wishing to undermine the importance for patients of 
these improvements, they were not of such importance to have required protracted 
correspondence and attention from Whitehall civil servants.  This reinforces the point 
that there was an emphasis on such detail precisely because the Ministry was unable 
to adequately influence the bigger picture. 
 
At a result, at the local level what emerges is not the overbearing influence or control 
of the Ministry of Health, but rather its essential weakness, camouflaged by its public 
commitment to local autonomy.  Whitehall civil servants were too far removed from 
the daily reality of policy formation and implementation - periodic letters couched in 
polite bureaucratic language were of little use when not backed up by any actual 
action.  Instead what is revealed is the importance of prominent local politicians and 
the role, positive or negative, of officials such as the Town Clerk and the MOH.  
Analysis of this kind is further reinforced by the evidence of some of the witnesses to 
the 1938 Welsh tuberculosis inquiry who expressed ‘dissatisfaction with the MoH and 
with the Welsh Board of Health in that these bodies do not exercise their powers of 
supervision and control sufficiently strongly, firmly or quickly against the local 
authorities who are backward or neglectful’.90 
 
The foregoing suggests that the Ministry, despite the assertions of the CMO, actually 
had very little impact on the actions of the localities, while immersing itself in the 
petty details of health service provision.  Indeed this may have been something which 
solidified over time as officials made a show of seeking innovation and expansion 
while, in a climate of financial retrenchment, being content to see particular local 
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circumstances as obstructing or constraining positive change.  There is, as we have 
shown, sufficient evidence to make this a tenable interpretation.  However 
qualifications do have to be made.  In this section we explore attempts by the Ministry 
to foster regional and national institutions, and to encourage councils to develop 
relationships either with other local authorities or with voluntary institutions.  The 
broader context here, alluded to above, is the debates taking place, particularly in the 
1930s, about the virtues or otherwise of ‘regionalism’.91  While the Ministry once 
again liked to appear to be taking a ‘hands off approach’, in the case of fostering 
inter-agency cooperation it was more willing to push its agenda of cooperation, claims 
of central impartiality notwithstanding.  This approach was thus heavily veiled with 
bureaucratic formalism and, once again, an official commitment to local autonomy.   
 
Such a case was the prolonged development of the Poole Joint Sanatorium, which was 
finally established in the late 1930s to serve the tuberculosis patients of six County 
Boroughs in the north-east.  The north-east in the 1930s was noted as having a 
combination of high death rates from tuberculosis and a lack of institutional 
accommodation for sufferers.  Lack of provision was partly due to the poor economic 
situation of the region, but also to the fact that the demand in any one County 
Borough was not sufficient to justify establishing an institution.  As a remedy there 
evolved the idea of a regional joint sanatorium to which all contributing authorities 
could send patients.  In June 1931 a conference was attended by representatives of the 
councils of Darlington, Gateshead, Middlesbrough, South Shields, Sunderland and 
West Hartlepool; and of the Ministry.  The intention was to discuss provision of a 
joint tuberculosis institution ‘but difficulties were felt by certain of the Authorities on 
the question of joint provision and no definite action was taken’. The proposal was 
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revived in 1933 to try and make more progress, helped by fact that Middlesbrough 
Town Council had received gifts of a house and large estate for their own treatment of 
TB sufferers.  The Ministry stated in its Annual Report that the case highlighted ‘a 
matter of public health importance which can be solved only by the co-operation of 
several Authorities’.  Although not wanting to minimise the difficulties of joint action, 
the Minister felt ‘confident that he (could) rely on the good will and commonsense of 
local authorities to make the machinery of Local Government subservient to the end 
to be attained’. 92  The public face of this scheme, as presented by the Ministry, was 
one which, while there may have been some organisational difficulties, was 
essentially a project by and for the County Boroughs concerned. 
 
But the image of a local authority driven scheme belied the delicate and complex 
negotiations conducted behind the scenes by the MoH.  In fact, the scheme was not 
even originally a local authority proposal, but instead ‘the result of persuasion by the 
MoH over a period of years.’93  In December 1930, following an enquiry from South 
Shields, which was suffering from a shortage beds for tuberculosis patients, the 
Ministry had conducted a local survey.  This found that the region as a whole needed 
a sanatorium of about two hundred beds.  Civil servants, however, realised the 
constraints facing them and saw purportedly local initiative as one way round these.  
One astute official observed that ‘I doubt…whether in this period of industrial 
depression which especially affects these local authorities the Ministry could urge the 
local authorities to establish a joint sanatorium although the need for this provision is 
sufficiently clear’.  Nor was this the only anticipated problem, for ‘the rivalry existing 
between these different local authorities’ was ‘a bar to effective cooperation’.  On the 
other hand, it would be ‘another matter’ if the local authorities came up with the 
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proposal themselves.  This would then give the Ministry the opportunity to encourage 
such a plan, which of course was what it wanted all along.  So, it was suggested, ‘we 
might invite the Medical Officers of Health to a purely informal conference’ when the 
possibility of the authorities bringing forward a proposal for a joint sanatorium ‘might 
be explored’.94  Although employing the cautious approach typical of the civil service, 
the intention and desired outcomes are clearly evident here. 
 
Consequently the Ministry set about convincing the local authorities that a joint 
sanatorium was a scheme which they should take on, with some support coming from 
the centre.   The aim here was, as one civil servant put it, to get ‘sufficient local 
authorities in the north-east area to express sympathy with the idea of a joint scheme’ 
and whose combined needs would justify a financially viable sanatorium, although it 
was also recognised that prevailing economic conditions might impede immediate 
progress.
95
  In a letter to South Shields, the Ministry thus outlined its position as 
follows:  ‘if the Town Council, after consultation with the other local authorities, are 
of the opinion that a conference to consider the question generally would be of 
advantage, then the Minister would willingly be represented at it’.96  In private, 
however, officials were less disingenuous.  While they did appear genuinely 
concerned to make an attempt to transfer the initiative to the localities, this equally 
did not mean that they were willing to give up ultimate directorship of the project.  In 
a classic example of civil service circumspection, it was suggested that  
we must leave the numbers of admission (to the joint meeting) entirely to the 
LA, though you might take the opportunity of suggesting that small numbers 
are perhaps likely to be more conducive to practical business.  Though the 
Ministry have, in fact, invited members to take part in this conference, it is not 
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initiated as a conference summoned by the Minister, and I would prefer it to 
be regarded as a conference of local authorities to which the Ministry are 
sending representatives to assist them.
97
 
 
Such convoluted thinking and writing demonstrates the delicate balancing act central 
officials felt obliged to perform in their quest to encourage local authorities to follow 
suggestions stemming from the Ministry.  They give substance to Ross’s claims, cited 
earlier, about the attitude of Sir Gwilym Gibbon.  Equally, they also suggest that 
behind the public face of the Ministry, with its acceptance of local authority 
independence, there was a propensity for officials to see policy in national as much as 
in local terms.  Another way of interpreting this tension is in the context of the 
relative strength of central and local government in the policy process.  On the one 
hand the documents show that the Ministry was able to push specific policy proposals 
on councils, but on the other, the roundabout manner in which they had to go about 
the task again brings to the fore the ultimate weakness of their position.
98
 
 
Yet at the same time the local authorities themselves seem, in certain circumstances, 
to have appreciated the role taken by the MoH, which was able to negotiate and use 
its status to push local authority cooperation.  South Shields, in their reply to the 
Ministry over the possibility of an initial meeting, claimed that ‘the probability of the 
local authorities concerned agreeing to attend such a conference is much greater if the 
conference is called by the Ministry rather than by my council’.99  And this was not an 
isolated example.  In West Hartlepool the suggestion of increased cooperation 
between council health services and local voluntary hospitals led Captain Farmer, 
whom we encountered earlier, to argue that if the recommendations came from West 
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Hartlepool Corporation then they ‘would be resented, and would be rejected at once.  
But, if it came from the Ministry, he felt sure that it would be considered’.100  Clearly 
then, the Ministry was valued at some level, giving weight and prestige to certain 
proposals and perhaps able to generate a degree of momentum denied to a single 
authority.  In this sense it did succeed in performing one of the roles envisaged by its 
creators, although again it clearly falls short of what some of its more radical founders 
would have wished. 
 
But it is important not assume that was always the case that the MoH, in pushing their 
concern for national or regional schemes, always had the ‘right’ answer, nor that local 
authorities were necessarily the backsliders or unreconstructed reactionaries.  The 
case of tuberculosis service provision in Wales provides an example of a conflict of 
interest between different groups.  The Ministry, through the agency of the Welsh 
Board, favoured a regional structure; the councils, on the other hand, were proponents 
of local provision.  This case should not be seen as central innovators versus local 
backwoodsmen, but rather as demonstrating how there were different interpretations 
over the best means for taking forward health service organisation, with both sides 
presenting valid arguments to support their respective cases.  In 1921 all Welsh 
County Boroughs and County Councils entered into an agreement with the Welsh 
National Memorial Association for provision of all care for persons suffering from 
tuberculosis.
101
  This meant that, unlike in England where local authorities were 
directly responsible for dispensaries run by Tuberculosis Officers as well as in many 
cases sanatorium or hospital treatment, in Wales the Association provided the full 
spectrum of services apart from after-care.  It had its own sanatoria, Tuberculosis 
Officers, hospitals, and research facilities, all integrated components of the 
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Principality-wide organisation.  While it was technically a voluntary body, the local 
authorities were the major contributors to its funds and had majority representation on 
several of its key committees.  At the end of the inter-war period the Report of the 
Enquiry into Tuberculosis in Wales (the Davies Report) praised the Association for 
the quality of its sanatoria while also remarking upon its failure to provide a full 
tuberculosis service and to fully co-ordinate with local authorities.
102
  Yet this issue of 
the organisation of the clinical and preventive services, and the respective roles of the 
local authorities and the voluntary Association, was not new.  While local authorities 
were largely blamed for the failure to keep their side of the bargain, it was they who 
had first highlighted the problems they faced in providing a coordinated tuberculosis 
service.
103
 
 
In 1922 both Cardiff and Newport Borough Councils voted that the work of the 
Tuberculosis Officer and his staff, rather than being part of the Association, should 
come under the direct control of the Health Committee through the MOH.
104
  Invited 
by the Coordination Committee of Newport County Borough to give details of the 
lack of coordination in the health services, the local MOH, Dr Howard Jones, 
prepared a detailed document enumerating the shortcomings of the local medical 
service.  He complained that medical work in the borough was divided between his 
own department, the School Medical Service and the Welsh National Memorial 
Association.  It was his belief, Jones continued, that in no other English or Welsh 
County Borough was there three separate organisations doing public health work.  In 
Newport the outcome was that there was ‘much overlapping of efforts in many 
directions, a large amount of unnecessary clerical work… ignorance on the part of one 
dept in reference to the work of others, and much unnecessary work in the visitation 
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of homes by different officials’.  Jones believed that in order to create an effective 
department, he needed all health services centralised under his control, and quoted the 
CMO at length in order to justify his position.  He was thus of the opinion that 
Newport’s decision to hand over control to the Association - whose object was to deal 
with tuberculosis throughout Wales – was ‘contrary to the principle upon which local 
government is based in this country’; had reduced sensitivity to local tuberculosis 
problems; had unnecessarily constrained medical staff; and, overall, had led to 
inefficient provision.  Thus while the Welsh National Memorial Association was 
efficient in providing institutional treatment, ‘better progress would take place if local 
authorities carried out the detailed work themselves apart from the provision of 
sanatoria and Training Colonies’.105 
 
In short, here was a clear and systematic consideration of the failings of his 
authority’s health service to properly coordinate the discharge of its duties.  Jones saw 
existing tuberculosis care as one important component part of the wider problem of 
coordination, and gave similar consideration to the organisation of other services 
under his control.  He was a local official who had a thoughtful approach to the 
administration of local services, and their coordination, and thus someone who would 
seem to have been pushing for the kind of coordination that the MoH purportedly 
sought to promote in the 1930s.  Despite the carefully thought out nature of these 
proposals, however, the Welsh Board of Health put considerable effort into 
preventing the suggestions of Howard Jones being put into practice.  As with Poole 
Sanatorium there was a concerted attempt to present the central authority as an 
impartial arbiter and dispenser of advice.  But behind the scenes we can discern a very 
clear sense of a rather different agenda.  In a meeting between the Welsh Board and 
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Newport and Cardiff councils the Board stated that they ‘had an open mind and held 
no brief for the Association’.  Despite this assertion, it was admitted that recently the 
emphasis had been on pressing local authorities to ‘support the comprehensive 
scheme…(and) to carry out their own obligations as to notifications and urging them 
to cooperate wholeheartedly with the Association and the Tuberculosis Physicians’.  
The Board thought that the first line of attack should be to concentrate on the ‘best 
means of surmounting difficulties rather than to find Authorities breaking away from 
the comprehensive scheme before making a real effort’.106 
 
This statement only hints at the level of commitment the Board actually felt towards 
the national nature of the scheme run by the Association.  An internal minute admitted 
that: ‘We are hoping that some kind of compromise will ultimately be arrived at 
which will preserve the comprehensive character of the scheme, but at the same time 
give the Councils a rather more direct interest in the work, particularly as regards 
Health Visiting’.  Failure to achieve this goal would almost certainly result in councils 
terminating existing agreements with the Association and appointing their own TB 
Officers.  In turn, this would mean ‘the beginning of a process of breaking up the 
scheme by which Wales is regarded as a unit for this purpose.  We are anxious to 
avoid this…’.107  The Board also consistently defended the importance of having 
Tuberculosis Officers employed nationally through the Association, rather than by 
individual local authority schemes.  In this way, it asserted, they could be part of a 
specialist service with ‘all the resources and experience’ of the Association at their 
command, and poorer and sparsely populated areas had as much access to a 
comprehensive and specialist service as the towns.
108
  Throughout the inter-war 
period the Association itself also set great store by the specialised professional status 
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of their Tuberculosis Officers, stating categorically that they would not like anything 
which would ‘weaken the sense of corporate responsibility that at present exists 
among the medical staff of the Association in their national scheme’.109 
 
The unswerving defence of the Association’s role in the provision of tuberculosis put 
forward by the Welsh Board of Health must, however, be distinguished from the 
Ministry of Health.  The latter adopted a rather more nuanced approach.  So, for 
example, while it was against the idea that the councils should break entirely from the 
Association (in fact, this was not what councils such as Newport and Cardiff were 
arguing) the MoH also felt ‘some sympathy with the desire of the Councils to have 
their own dispensaries and appoint their own Tuberculosis Officers’.  It acknowledged 
the difficulties and inefficiencies of working under the present scheme, not least 
because of the ‘large amount of overlapping’ between council and Association 
officers.  Indeed, this particular correspondence continued, ‘it would seem to be 
impossible for the councils to have any adequate control over TB in their areas so 
long as the work of those officers is carried out independently of the MoH’.110  The 
Ministry suggested, perhaps inevitably, a messy compromise.  This was found ‘very 
helpful’ by the Welsh Board, which took it up with a few alterations.111  Tuberculosis 
nurses at the dispensary could come under the control of the council, as could an 
amount of administrative work, both of which were to be paid for by the Association.  
The central issue of the status of the Tuberculosis Officer however, was not resolved, 
as they were to stay in the employ of the Association, much to the disgust of the 
Medical Officers for Newport and Cardiff.
112
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The question then remains, why did Newport and Cardiff acquiesce to this 
arrangement, given the fact that their principal demand had not been met?  One reason 
can be found in the records of the final meeting.  Once again the role of individuals in 
the policy process comes to the fore, as the Newport Town Clerk was key to the 
borough’s ultimate decision.  He had been at the forefront of the discussions with his 
attitude being that, ‘if a service was not obtained for the money contributed, then it 
was a very important factor for consideration.  They (the council) were only going to 
consider the question as it concerned them as a County Borough’.  Fundamental to his 
position was value for money, and his belief that the council were contributing more 
to the scheme than they received from it.  He gave no indication that he had any 
interest in the administrative structure of the Health Department, but simply that he 
wished to safeguard his council’s finances.  Both the Board and the Association had 
done some research into the relative contributions to and benefits from the scheme of 
Newport, which they presented at the meeting.  Although the two sets of figures 
differed, both showed that the council was a net beneficiary of the scheme.  And 
while the Town Clerk protested that these figures had not been checked by the 
Borough Treasurer, this data and the compromise whereby the Association would 
cover certain costs swung him behind remaining within the latter’s scheme.  As a 
result both Newport and Cardiff agreed to accept the terms offered and agreed to defer 
their decision on the Tuberculosis Officer for twelve months.  This decision was in 
fact deferred indefinitely, and their position remained the same until 1939.
113
 
 
The case once again points to the importance of unpicking the dynamics of internal 
council politics when analysing relationships with central departments.  A lack of 
unity on the part of council officials and members could essentially result in a 
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continuation of the status quo.  It also suggests that ultimately the influence of the 
Town Clerk was greater than that of the MOH, who wished to improve the 
administrative structure of his department, and not simply to save money.  Here the 
inertia of the council worked against its own proposals, just as it could work against 
central attempts to instigate change. This example also suggests the that the decisions 
of the Welsh Board could be filtered and diluted by the MoH, raising the possibility of 
that an already weak ministry could be further weakened by the extra layer of local 
bureaucracy.  Certainly the Welsh Board was criticised by contemporaries for its 
ineffectual nature.  Clement Davies, following his Tuberculosis Inquiry, described it 
as a ‘useless moribund organisation’, and as a ‘National Waste Paper Basket’ where 
reports of medical officers and sanitary inspectors were discarded.
114
 
 
This article has shown that there is no simple narrative of dependence/independence 
when considering the position of the Ministry of Health in relation to the local 
authorities during the inter-war period.  Different stories emerge, with outcomes 
dependent on a variety of local and national contextual factors.  If the Ministry was 
weak, it did not start out that way, containing as it did some of the best administrators 
of the day and a prominent role in the process of reconstruction.  However historical 
chance, in the death of Morant and the removal of Addison, combined with the LGB’s 
particular legacy, ensured that the Ministry’s relationship with the local authorities 
was governed by caution and reinforced by a lack of real power.  Therefore, despite 
the enthusiasm of the CMO, the Ministry was unable to coerce recalcitrant authorities 
into making what it deemed to be necessary improvements.  While civil servants felt 
that they were acting in the best tradition of guiding and informing rather than 
coercing local authorities, individual officials expressed frustration and did their best 
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to direct policy from behind the scenes.  For Ministry officials this lack of power 
could also result in an over-concentration on the minutiae of health service provision 
within an area, as they were unable to force movement on bigger issues such as 
appropriation or cooperation with voluntary hospitals. 
 
It is important, though, not simply or automatically to attribute the Ministry’s 
commitment to a ‘hands-off’ advisory relationship with local authorities to the 
weakness of their position: even when they were in principle able to enforce punitive 
measures, as in West Hartlepool, they shrank from doing so.  Civil servants actively 
believed that persuasion, encouragement, and information sharing, and not heavy 
handed coercion, was the best means of getting things done.  Perhaps it is fortunate 
for Ministry officials that their administrative ethos tallied so neatly with the level of 
power they were able to exert.  Furthermore, over time the difficulties of working in 
an atmosphere of financial retrenchment almost certainly added to what we might 
now perceive as civil service caution.  Adding to this complex picture, it is also clear 
that the Ministry did have standing in relation to the localities.  As their role in the 
Poole Sanatorium case demonstrated, there were clearly times when the weight of 
central involvement could also add the necessary prestige to a scheme to ensure that it 
did not degenerate into inter-council bickering.  Both this case, and that of 
tuberculosis care in Wales, demonstrate the Ministry’s commitment to producing 
regional structures to counteract the limitations of local authority provision.  But, as 
the stance of the MOH for Newport showed, this was only one vision of health service 
organisation current in the inter-war period.  The balance between regional and local 
service provision was a dialogue which was to be interrupted by the Second World 
War, and pushed to one side by the arrival of the NHS. 
  41 
 
In this article we have also stressed the importance of certain key roles within a local 
authority for mediating its relationship with the centre, and the progress or inhibition 
of a scheme.  It is therefore vital to disaggregate the monolithic categories of both ‘the 
council’ and ‘the centre’– we need a more sophisticated understanding and analysis of 
roles taken by council representatives and officials, as well as a deeper understanding 
of how the agency of councils was expressed in its relationship with the centre. 
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